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Officially  supported export credits,  an  importanit souirce of
external finance for developing coountries  until the early 1980s,
are showing signs of regaining momentum. Sub-Saharan Africa
stands to gain most from the increasing cooperation between the
exportcreditagencies and such  multilateral  development agencies
as the World Bank.
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This  paper  - a product  of the  Dcbt and  Inteniational  Finance  and  International Trade  Divisions,
International Economics Department -is  pari of' a larger efflrt  in PRE to smudy  alternative sources of'
external t'inancc to developing  countries  in general,  and to the African  region  in parlicular.  C'opics  are
available f'ree f'rom  the World Bank, 1818 II Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact CiGrace
llogon, room S7-0.33,  exteinsioni  33732 (40 pages with  tables).
Like all low-income areas, Sub-Saharan Africa  ment, dcvelopment ai(i and bank leInding  will
received only a modest share of the early ol'fi-  remain suppressed.  Consequently, officially
cially supported export credit boom.  But the  supporteid  export credits cain reemerge as an
share of'officially supported export credits in  important source of relatively cheap and readily
Sub-Saharan African countries' external linanic-  availablef  linancing.
ing differed little from that of'  other developing
countries.  Officially guaranteed credits covered  Increasing cooper-ationi  between export credit
a morc important chunk o  'apital llows to Sub-  agencies and such multilateral development
Saharan Africa from private financial sources  agencies as thc World Bank is a very positivo
compared to that for higher income developing  development in reducing the waste anid  increas-
countries.  Although private capital flows to Sub-  ing thc efficiency of' officially supported export
Saharan Africa are relatively small, this closc  credits lor both thc d,onor and:i  thc recipicent
link suggests the importance of official support  countries.  Sub-Saiharan  African couniities, which
in realizing these flows. But of'ficially supported  are impaired bc the shortage of technical skills
export credits, designed as policy tools primarily  and administrative capacit  and w\hich  many  have
to boost exports, were distortive ani'd  infc'licient  suffcied hi,avily l'froIm  ill practices in export
financial  instruments,  for both thc exporting  and  credits,  stand  to gain most  f'oI  tiis  cooperation.
the recipicnt counitries.
Finall\,  a miajor  source of inc fficiencv in tile
Under thC  pressure of earlier losses and  usc of,  external l'undc]s,  lwcieter  officially sup-
increasing scrutin) by thcir guardian autholirities  portied  export ciredits  or other luids,  is distortionis
and national legislatures, cxport credit agencies  in the doiimestic  econonlics ol tli  btorTOWilng
have becn increasing thc flexibility ot' their  counitries. l'o  induce lending to tihe  private
operations  and  their  relianlcc on nlarkct Forces  fOr  sector by cxport  cre(dit aoeticies,  the  recipient
pricinig  decisionis.  coulinties illust improve thc elfficiency  ol tileir
marketplace  and inlstitutionls.
Demirguq-Kunt and Erzan conitenid  that,
given thc currenit  cconlomilic  and political environ-
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I.  Introduction
This  paper  addresses  the  question  of  how  important  officially
supported export credits (OSECs)  were, both in quantity and in quality, in  Sub-
Saharan Africa's  (SSA) external  financing during the  last two  decades,  and
examines the prospects for the 1990s.
OSECs comprise suppliers' and buyers' credits which are officially
supported  by  way  of  direct  credits,  refinancing,  eligibility  for  interest
subsidies, guarantee or insurance.  Official institutions  which either directly
extend  export  credits  or  provide  some  form  of  support  or  guarantee  are
generically called export credit agencies (ECAs).
It should  be emphasized that OSECs were not designed to address the
financial  needs of  developing countries.  The surge in  OSECs came about  when  most
OECD countries perceived them as an economic policy tool, primarily to boost
exports, in the wave of the new protectionism and mercantilism that swept over
the industrial countries in the early 1970s.  Consequently, OSECs soon became
The authors are economists at the International Economics Department,
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a princ`4.l aource of external capital for the developing countries and for
Eastern  Europe,  second only  to  private bank  lending.  And  soon  most  OECD
countries had to  agree on  some guidelines  for their official export  credit
practices to avoid "destructive competition", particularly in credits extended
to industrial countries.
With the onset of the debt crisis in 1982, most ECAs experienced
financial difficulties due to the widespread payment arrears, and later, in  the
mid 1980s, as a result of a large number of Paris Club debt reschedulings.  An
increasing number of countries with severe debt servicing problems were taken
off-cover by ECAs.  The general cut-back policy of the ECAs came in re3ponse to
their growing portfolio problems and waning budgetary support, coupled with the
charges that they had  provided export guarantees  too freely,  contributing to the
debt crisis.  On the demand side, low rates of investment in debtor countries
drastically reduced demand for capital goods.  As new commitments fell sharply,
OSEC flows  became negative  on a  net  basis.  However,  with the recent move towards
matching the cover policies with the adjustment progress made  in the indebted
countries, those countries which did hot have to resort to debt rescheduling or
rescheduled in  an  orderly fashion  startea  receiving substantial new  commitments.
Increased flexibility in ECAs' operations, particularly  greater reliance on
market forces for pricing decisions, contributed to this turnaround as well as
improved demand conditions for capital goods.  Nevertheless, it  was not before
the end of the decade that OSECs once again started yielding net  flows for
developing countries.
A  predominant  share  of  OSECs  were  extended  to  mriddle income3
developing countries and to the OPEC countries as they proved to have an immense
absorptive capacity.  Like all low income areas, SSA had a modest share in the
total.  From the point of  view of SSA, however, the share cf OSECs  in their
external  financing  did  not  difLer  much  from the  case  of  other  developing
countries.  As a  matter of fact, officially guaranteed credits covered a more
important  chunk of capital flows  to SSA from private financial qources compared
to that for higher income developing countries.  Although private capital flows
to SSA are relatively small, this close link suggests the importance  of official
support in the realization of these flows.
In many countries, the operations of the ECAs are 'inder  increasing
scrutiny by their guardian authorities and national legislatures, and the very
need and rationale for  the existing export credit programs are being questioned.
It is difficult to reject  the proposition that, ideally, official ECAs should
disappear, leaving  export credit and insurance  to the  market and development aid
to aid agencies.  However, it is equally difficult to write-off the argument
that, given the shortcomings of international capital markets witnessed bv the
debt  crisis,  and  the  political  economy  of  aid,  OSECs  mobilize  additional
resources for development.  The present paper does not attempt to resolve these
issues, and  adopts the  premise  that,  in the  foreseeable  future, ECAs  will
continue to be important agents in international financial markets.
The paper is organized in the following way:  Section II briefly
explains the financial structure of foreign trade, the role of export credits
in this context, and the basic functions of ECAs.  Section III presents the
trends in OSECs during the 1970s and the 19&0s as a source of external finance4
Lor developing countries in  general, and for  SSA in  particular.  Also a snapshot
of the pLzfile of OSECs is provided.
Section IV  deals  with some  of  the distortions caused  by  export credit
subsidies, including the problems of "moral hazard" and "adverse aelecti
Section V briefly takes up the current need and prospects for external finance
in the 1990s.  Section VI addresses how to enhance the efficiency of  OSECS,
emphasizing the cooperation between ECAs and multilateral development agencies
(MDAs),  an issue particularly important  for poorer developing countries such as
those in SSA.  Finally, Section VII sums up the conclusions.5
II.  Financial Structure of International Trade, and Export Credit Agencies
International trucdG  is  basically finan.  id  by  export credits.  credit
periods differ depending on, inter alia, the  properties of the exported products
and  the recipient countries.  However, the bulk of export credits are short-term
credits with maturities of around two months which are extended by the exporters
--  i.e.,  suppliers'  credits.  A small fraction of exports --  mostly investment
goods to  developing countries  and Eastern  Europe  --  are financed by export
credits with several years' payment periods.  These longer export credits can
be suppliers' credits, but also banks and other financial institutions play an
important  role  by either  taking  over  the exporters'  claims or  by  directly
extending  credits to the  buyers  abroad or  to their  banks  --  i.e., buyers'
credits.
Typically, over 60 percent .f total commodity exports of industrial
countries are financed by suppliers' credits (cver 10 days), thereof only less
than 10 percent with a maturity over 6 months, and i_.  than 5 percent with a
maturity over one year (see  Grassman  (1973) and Erzan  (1980)).  The remaining
are advance and cash payments (and  credits  up to 10  days).  Buyers' credits, dnd
suppliers' credits that are cashed are included in  this latter  portion.  A rough
estimate for  financial credits  over  one  year, i.e.  buyers' credits  and suppliers'
credits that are taken over by banks and otier financial institutions, would be
around 5 percent of total exports.  The average payment period of  these credits
is generally well over 2 years.  Adding up the longer term sup?liers' credits
and these  financial  credits, roughly 10 percent of exports  are  financed by
credits with a maturity over one year.6
Initially, the focus of official sauport was predominantly on these
medium and long-term export credits.  Accordingly, the guidelines drawn by the
OECD countries on OSECs to avo;.d  "destructive competition" did not even address
short-term export credits.  Lately, there has been a major increase in short-
term OSECs. 1 In addition to guarantees, subsidization in support of grain and
raw material sales has become a common pract_ce.  However due to problems in
statistical coverage, the analysis in the present paper is limited to medium-
and long-term financing.
Operations of the Export Credit Agencies
All .r.ajor  exporting countries have some degree of support to ensure
availability of export credits as a means of promoting the exports of goods and
services.  In  the  case oi industrial  countries,  the increasing  prominence of  ECAs
coincided with these countries, balance of payments difficulties following the
1973  oil shock.  For  many smaller  OECD countries,  however, putting their industry
in equal footing with the other exporters, i.e. "neutralization",  was a genuine
concern (see  Erzan (1980)).  For the relatively advanced developing countries,
setting up their own ECAs was perceived as a tradie  policy tool to accelerate
export orientation.
Export  credit  systems  vary  from  country  to  countrl  in  their
1  Three  factors have been pointed out to account  for the  increase in
official cover for short-term business: i) the debtors' priority in servicing
these  credits  to  preserve  the  flow of  essential  imports,  ii)  smallness of
individual contracts which allows the agencies better control their exposure,
and iii)  with few  exceptions, exclusion  of short-term clains from  Paris  Club  debt
reschedulings (Johnson,  Fisher and Harris (199.)).7
institutional  structure and  lending policies  (see OECD  (1990d)).  They  are
established to promote national exports  and to carry out their government's
industrial, commercial or foreign policies.  Export credit . ;encies exist to
provide funds directly, to refinance or to guarantee other providers.  When
finance is  supplied directly by export  credit agencies,  it is often called
"official export credit."  They have no manuate to ensure that the provided
resources contr4.bute  to the development of the importing country.
ECAs subsidize credits in two ways.  First, tihey  advance loans at
interest rates below market rates.  To restrict competition through interest
subsidies and to increase transparency, in 1976 the OECD countries adopted a
gentlemen's agreement, referred to as the "Consensus". 2 The Consensus, which is
amended  periodically,  establishes  guidelines  concerning  financial  terms for  OSECs
with a repayment term of over  two years.  A  matrix of minimum applicable interest
rates for different categories of loan currencies and borrowing countries are
defined,  and  downpayment  requirements,  maximum  repayment  periods,  etc.  are
established.3  Throughout the years, the minimum permissible interest rates camu
closer to the market rates, and in the case of high income developing countries
and industrial countries, the gap was eliminated in 1987 (sea  OECE (1990c) and
Ray  (1986) and (1990)).
ECAs provide a second type of export credit subsidy through their
2 The 1976 "Consensus  of Converging Export Credit Policies"  was formalized
as the "Arrangement  on Guidelines for  OSECs" and became effective in April 1978.
3  Furthermore, prior notification is demanded when credit terms "softer"
than those allowed by the arrangement are offered.  The notification is meant
to give the possibility of "matching" to other countries.8
guarantee and insurance schemes.  The" extend loans directly and self-insure
repayment  or give  coverage  to the financial  insticutions  which provide  the funds.
In  either  case,  the  ECA  insures  the  lender  against  the  political  and/or
commercial risks of non-payment.  This is an implicit credit subsidy to the
extent that the premium charged is below what it would co0t at the marketplace
for assuming the same risk.  The consensus described above does not cover tne
terms and conditions of insurance and guarantees provided by official agencies
and thl.3  does not govern the provision of implicit support through the premium
structure.
The  ECAs  have  traditionally  charged  a  fixed  premium  for their
insurance subsidies and went  "off -- over" when countries started rutning into
debt-servicing difficulties.  However *n recent years, due to financial losses
experienced by the ECAs, in  an effort to charge higher premiums for higher risk
contracts,  there has been  a movement towards  a more  differentiated  premium
structure.  Generally, premiums depend on the term of the contract and the risk
category of the recipient country.  With variable prices, agencies can provide
cover even for countries with payment difficulties.  More recently, some ECAs
also try to price each contract individually to reflect the risk of nonpaymenu
by the buyer.
Finally, most ECAs provide  qontroversial  form of finance called
"mixed  credits".  These are commercial  tied aid credits that have a concessional
element, produced either by mixing grants and commercial  loans or  by direct
interest subsidies on commercial loans.  According to the Consensus, currently,
this concessional element has to be more than 35 percent of a mixed credit, and9
greater  than  50 percent  in  tuie  case  of  the  poorer developing  countries.
However, as in other OSECs, implicit subsidies through insurance ar.d  guarantees
are not regulated.
III.  Trends during the 1970s and the 1980s. and the Profile of OSECs
The  importance of OSECs  in the external  financing of developing
countr.es can best be captured from statistics on net resource flows.  Data on
outstanding debt and changes therein can provide a further check.  Finally,
statistics  on  new  credit commitments  are  the appropriate indicators  of tenuencies
and  turning  poinits in OSEC  activity.  We  make  use  of  all  three  sets  of
information in our brief presentation be'cw, acknowledging the well documented
statistical and methodological shortcomings underlying the available data. 4
Net Flows
The annual net flow of medi%am-  and long-term OSECs from OECD to
deveioping countries,  which was around 2  to 3  billion dollars in  the early 1970s,
increased to over 13 biilion by the end of the decade (see  Table .);.  In 1977
they accounted for 27 percent of all net external capital flows to deveioping
4
4  See World Bank, et al  (1989) and Johnson, Fisher and Harris  (1990),
Appendix .I.
5  Based on data given in Appendix Tables  IA and  IB, from the Creditor
Reporting System (CRS)  of the OECD (see  OECD (1990b)).  The flows are from the
member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD.TABLE I
NET FLOWS  OF OFFICIALLY  SllPPORTED  MEDIUM-  AND LONG-TERM  EXPORT  CREDITS  TO SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA  AND TO ALL DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES,  1970-1988
(US  S MILLIONS)
TO SU8-SAMARAN  AFRICA
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1962  1983  198U  1985  1986  1987  1988
Direct  Otficial  4  54  51  151  64  Thi  96  78  42  77  -32  189  95  168  -69  177  -79  -79  -29 Guaranteed Private  230  234  228  445  562  983  839  1864  1071  1605  1729  1326  1499  749  -30  -70  -483  1C62  -1603 Total  OSECs  234  288  279  595  626  1134  935  1941  1113  1682  1697  1515  1594  917  -99  107  -562  -1141  -1632 TotaL  OSECs/Totat  Inflows  16.6X  16.7X  14.4X  23.8X  22.5X  25.2X  23.2X  35.1X  18.1X  23.3S  17.3X  14.7X  14.2X  11.2K  n.s.  n.a.  n.s.  n.a.  n.s. Guaranteed  Private/Total  Private  51.2  40.8K  36.2K  54.1X  56.5%  47.3X  55.5X  67.5K  43.6X  59.4X  44.1X  30.0X  28.0X  31.5S  n.a.  r-a.  n.p.  n.a.  n.a.
OSEC Credit  Composition
Direct  Official  1.8K  18.6K  18.3K  25.3X  10.3X  13.3X  10.2X  4.0X  3.8K  4.6K  n.a.  12.5K  5.9X  18.3K  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. Guaranteed Private  98.2K  81.4K  81.7X  74.7X  89.7X  86.7K  89.8X  96.0X  96.2X  95.4K  n.a.  87.5K  94.1K  81.7X  n.a.  .a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
TO ALL  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  '977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1962  1983  1984  1985  1966  1987  1968
Direct  Official  574  680  763  1024  672  1144  1341  1435  2052  1785  2168  2035  2564  2742  1364  -182  -1156  -2506  -1054 Guaranteed Private  2035  2685  1349  1201  2397  4354  6684  8736  9629  8940  10976  10810  7065  4693  3549  402  -2641  -4394  -1637 Total  OSECs  2609  3365  2112  2225  3069  5498  8025  10171  11681  10725  13144  12845  9629  7434  4913  220  -3797  -6899  -2691 Totat  OSECs/Totat Inflows  21.7X  25.5Z  15.0K  13.0X  19.3K  16.1K  23.0K  26.6K  21.4K  17.8K  22.7X  17.8S  15.31  14.80  8.2S  0.8X  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. Guaranteed Private/Total  Private  36.2X  44.3K  21.1X  14.7X  37.4K  19.1K  28.5K  33.1K  25.0X  21.6K  30.8K  21.6K  17.8X  16.6K  10.2K  16.2X  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
OSEC Credit  Cowposition
Direct  Official  22.0K  20.2X  36.1K  46.0K  21.9K  20.8X  16.7K  14.1K  17.6K  16.6K  16.5K  15.8K  26.6K  36.9K  27.8K  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. Guaranteed Private  78.0K  79.8X  63.9K  54.0K  78.1K  79.2X  83.3K  85.9K  82.4K  83.4K  83.5K  84.2S  73.4K  63.1X  72.2K  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Source:  OECD. Creditor  Reporting  System.
Note:  Direct  Official  *  export  credits  extended  directly  by official institutions. Guaranteed  Private  =  officiatty insured  supptiers'  credits  ptus guaranteed  bank credits. n.a. =  not  applicable.11
countries.  This  has declined  to 8 percent  in 1984,  and by 1985  the  net flow  was
negligible.  From  1986  throughout  1988,  net  OSECs  apparently  remained  in  the
negative6.  The  pattern  was  similar  in  the  case  of  the  Sub-Saharan  African
countries.  From  less  than  US$  half  a billion  in the  early  1970s,  OSECs  reached
US$2  billion  in 1977.  During  this  period,  the  share  of  SSA  in total  OSECs  to
developing  countries  also  climbed  from  less than  10 to over  20 percent.  In the
peak  year,  1977,  OSECs
accounted  for  35 percent  of  all  external  funds  to  SSA.  The  decline  in  OSECs
was  more  rapid  for SSA  however,  and  1983  was  the  last  year  yielding  a positive
net  flow7. But  long  before  that,  SSA's  share  in  total  OSECs  dropped
considerably.
Table  1 also  decomposes  OSECs  into  their  two  main  components:  i)
export  credits  extended  directly  by official  agencies,  and ii) officially  insured
suppliers'  credits  plus  guaranteed  bank  credits.  On the whole,  direct  official
export  credits  constituted  around  15 to  30 percent  of  a11  OSECs.  Their  share
was  considerably  lower  in the  case  of SSA.  The  table  also  gives  the  share  of
private  export  credits,  which  are  officially  insured  or  guaranteed,  in  total
private  capital  inflows.  While  the overall  ratio  was  generally  around  15 to 30
percent,  for SSA  it was  significantly  higher,  in the range  of 30 to 60 percent.
These  two comparisons  point  to the relative  importance  of official  guarantee  and
insurance  schemes  in providing  external  resources,  particularly  in attracting
6  Negative  net  flows  depicted  in Table  1  are  in  part  due  to  accounting
practices.  As  a result  of Paris  Club  debt  reschedulings,  ECAs  actually  remove
the  outstanding  claims  from  their  own  books  while  they  remain  in the  total  debt
figures.
7  See the  previous  footnote.12
private  capital  to  SSA.  To put  this  comparison  into  proper  perspective,  it
should be noted, however, that the share of private flows in total resource  flows
to SSA is considerably  lower than  that  for moat other  developing  regions.8
Outstandino  Stock
The decline  in the importance of OSECs during the 1980s can also be
observed  from  data  on  the  outstanding  debt  of  the  developing  countries  (see
Appendix  Table  2).  Appendix  Table  3  gives  the  share  of  OSECs  in  total
outstanding  debt,  and in public  and publicly  guaranteed  debt  of selected  Sub-
Saharan African  countries.9 Averages  for these shares, which were  respectively
17 and  24 percent  in 1985, declined  sharply  in the  latter  part  of the decade.
In 1988, they  ,ere 9 and 12 percent,  respectively.
New Commitments
While  net  flows  (given  in Table  1) continued  to  be negative,  new
commitments  of OSECs  to developing  countries  registered  an upturn  in 1988 and
1989, indicating  that the post-1982  decline might  be over  (see Table  2)10.  New
commitments  to developing  countries  which  amounted  to US$30.4  billion  in 1987
increased  by 8 percent  in 1988, and a robust 23 percent  in 1989.11  The 1988
a  Computations  based  on  Appendix  Tables  IA  and  1B  show  that,  for  all
developing  countries,  the share of private  capital  in total  resource  flows was
well  above  60 percent  from  1975 to 1982, declining  to about  30 percent  in the
late  1980s.  In the case  of SSA, the comparable  figure  was  around  40 percent,
and by 1984, private  flows became  negative.
9  The  stock  figures  are from the  Creditor  Reporting  System  (CRS) of the
OECD  (Appendix Table 2), and the Debtor Reporting  System  (DRS) of the World Bank.
10  Data  on new  commitments  are provided  by the OECD,  Secretariat  of the
Export  Credit  Group.
11  The  growth  rates  reported  in this  Section  are based  on SDR values  to
exclude  the changes  in the US$ exchange  rate.13
TABLE  2
FLOW  OF NEW  COMMITMENTS  OF OFFICIALLY  SUPPORTED
MEDIUM-  AND  LONG-TERM  EXPORT  CREDITS,  1981-1989
Category  la  Category  [Ia  Category  115a  Total  of
(Mainly  (Middle-Income  (Low-Income  Categories
Industrial)  DeveLoping)  Developing)  II  and  III
Countries  Countries  Countries  (Developing  Countries)  Total
A. Medium-  and  long-term  credits  with  an  initial  term  of  over  one  yearb,  billion  SDRs  tUSS  billion)d
1981  ...  ...  ...  ...  70.2  (82.8)
1982  ..  ...  ...  ...  77.5  (85.6)
1983  ...  ...  ...  ...  63.1  (67.5)
1984  . ...  ...  56.8  (58.2)
1985  11.8  (12.0)  24.1  (24.6)  10.5  (10.7)  34.6  (35.3)  47.1c  (47.8)
1986  10.0  (11.7)  19.0  (22.2)  9.7  (11.3)  28.7  (33.6)  39.3c  (46.1)
1987  12.4  (16.0)  16.2  (20.9)  7.3  ( 9.4)  Z3.5  (30.4)  36.4c  (47.1)
1988  7.3  (  9.8)  15.9  (21.3)  9.5  (12.7)  25.4  (34.0)  33.2c  (44.6)
1989  9.2  (11.8)  20.8  (26.6)  10.4  (13.3)  31.2  (39.9)  41.4c  (53.1)
B. Long-term  credits  with  an  initial  term  of  over  five  yearsb,  billion  SDRs  (USS  bilLion)d
1981  ...  ...  ...  .. 18.2  (21.5)
1982  ...  ...  ...  ...  18.5  (20.4)
1983  ...  ...  ..  ...  13.0  (13.9)
1984  1.8  (1.9)  6.8  (7.0)  2.5  (2.6)  9.3  (9.6)  11.1  (11.4)
1985  1.0  (1.0)  4.8  (4.9)  2.5  (2.6)  7.3  (7.4)  8.3  (  8.4)
1986  0.8  (0.9)  4.4  (5.1)  2.7  (3.2)  7.1  (8.3)  8.0  (  9.4)
1987  1.8  (2.3)  2.9  (3.7)  1.7  (2.2)  4.6  (5.9)  6.4  (  8.3)
1988  1.4  (1.9)  3.5  (4.7)  4.7  (6.3)  8.2  (11.0)  9.6 (12.9)
1989  2.4  (3.1)  3.6  (4.6)  1.9  (2.4)  5.5  (7.0)  7.9  (10.1)
C. Share  of  long-term  credits  in  total  (B/A),  percent
1981  ...  ...  ...  ...  25.9
1982  ...  ...  ...  ...  23.9
1983  ...  ...  ...  20.6
i984  ...  ...  ..  ...  19.5
1985  8.5  19.9  23.8  21.1  17.6
1986  8.0  23.2  27.8  24.7  20.4
1987  14.5  17.9  23.3  19.6  17.6
1988  19.2  22.0  49.5  32.3  28.9
1989  26.1  17.3  18.3  17.6  19.1
Source:  OECD,  Secretariat  of  the  Export  Credit  Group;  and  Johnson,  Fisher  and  Harris  (1990),  Table  1.
Notes:
a  The country  categories  correspond to  the  classification  used  by  the  OECD  consensus  on  Export  Credits.  Since
1982, this  Arrangement has classified  as  Category I  all  countries  with  a  GDP  per  capita  of  over  S4,000  per
annum  according  to  1979  data published  in  the 1981  World  Bank  Atlas;  as Category II  all  countries  not classified
in  Categories  I  or  III;  and as Category III  all  countries  etigible  for  IDA  credits  plus  any low-income  countries
or  territories  whose  GNP  per  capital  would not  exceed the  IDA eligibility  level.
b  The value  of  commitments  includes  principal  and insured  interest.
c  Includes  unallocated  credits,  so  total  exceeds  the  sum  of  the  categories.
d  SDRs  converted  to  USS  using  yearly  average  exchange  rates  from  IMF,  International  Financial  Statistics.14
expansion  was concentrated in  long-term  credits (with  repayment periods  over five
years) which went up 80 percent to US$11 billion.  In 1989, however, the growth
in OSECs was due to medium-term credits, and in fact the long-term commitments
declined.
In  1988  and 1989,  OSEC commitments  to low  income  developing  countries
increased  parallel with  the general  development.  SSA  experienced a slight  growth
in OSECs from US$3.3 to 3.6 billion in 1988, followed by a 23 percent rise in
1989 (see Table 3).
The Profile of OSECs
Statistics on new commitments allow a multi-dimensional breakdown
of the OSECs.  Since the mid-1980s, one quarter of all medium- and long-term
commitments  were  made  to  industrial  countries  and  high  income  developing
countries (from  Table 2).  Middle-income developing countries accounted for half
of the total, and low income countries received the remaining one quarter.  One
third of the new cornmitments  to low income developing countries was due to SSA
(see  Table 3).
The share of long-term credits in total OSEC commitments  (with an
initial term of over one year) fluctuated around 20 percent.  This ratio used
to be somewhat lower in the case of high income countries, and higher for low
income countries.  Recently this trend reversed and the industrial and highTABLE  3
FLOW  OF NEW COMMITMENTS  OF OFFICIALLY  SUPPORTED
MEDIUM-  AND  LONG-TERM  EXPORT  CREDITSa  TO SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICA,  1987-1989
Share  in lower  Share  in  Share  in
in_ome  developing  all  developing  all  recipientsb,
Year  SDRs.  million  IUSS.million)  countries.b  Percent  countriesb.  percent  percent
1987  2,584  (3,341)  35.3  11.0  7.1
1988  2,652  (3,564)  28.0  10.4  8.0
1989  3,274  (4,196)  31.4  10.5  7.9  U
Source:  OECD,  Secretariat  of the  Export  Credit  Group.
Notes:
a  See  notes  to Table  2.
b  The  denominators  are  from,  respectively,  columns  III,  IV and  V of Table  2, Part  A.TABLE  4
FLOW  OF NEW  COMMITMENTS  OF OFFICIALLY  SUPPORTED  LONG-TERMa
EXPORT  CREDITS  BY MAJOR  SECTORS,  1989
Total  Percentage  Distribution
US$ Million
Transportation  Telecommunications  Energy  Industry  Other
To All Countries  10,215  32  9  9  30  20
To Sub-Saharan  Africa  513  53  6  11  16  14
Source:  OECD,  Secretariat  of the Export  Credit  Group.
Note:  a  Long-term  credits  are those  with  an initial  term  of  over  five  years.17
income developing countries  started getting a larger chunk of the  long-term
credits.  Statistics on long-term  OSECs to SSA were available for  only 1989  when
they accounted for 12 percent of total new commitments over one year.
Statistics on sectoral  distribution of OSECs are available only for
long-term commitments (see  Tabie 4).  In 1989, transportation, with a share of
32  percent,  led  the  list,  followed  by  industry,  30  percent,  and
telec,mmunications and energy, 9 percent each.  In the case of SSA, the share
of transportation was an overwhelming 53 percent.  On the other hand, industry
received only 16 percent of the new commitments in this region.
IV.  Distortions due to Export Credit Subsidies
We noted that ECAs provide two main types of export subsidies. 12
First is the explicit subsidy through lower-than-market interest rates.  The
government either lends  to foreign  importers  directly  at rates  below its  marginal
cost of funds, or subsidizes such loans  made by commercial banks.  This kind of
subsidy appears in the government's budget aB  an expenditure.  The second type
is the implicit subsidy provided through the official insurance and guarantee
schemes  which often charged flat  premi_:ms  not reflecting  the actual risks  of non-
payment.  Financial difficulties of most ECAs in  the early and mid-1980s witness
12 Henry (1987)  provides evidence on the  magnitude of these subsidies.  The
study shows that financial profits reported by ECAs are due to inappropriate or
misapplied accounting methods.18
to the fact that theme implicit subsidies involved substantial magnitudes. 13 It
is likely that the 1976 Consensus which regulated int reat subsidies but not
the official insurance and guarantee schemes has lead to the growth of implicit
subsidies in  total export credit subsidies (see  James (1989),  Kohler (1984),  and
Kohler and Reuter (1986)).
Economic literature questioning the social value of export credit
subsidies is abundant  (see, e.g., Salant  (1984), Fleisig and Hill (1984), and
Fitzgerald and Monson  (1988)).  Nevertheless, as subsidies maintain or expand
employment and  economic activity in  selected sectors  and  presumably  boost exports
--  yet  not necessarily  their  value added  in international  prices  --  governments
are often  tempted to  promote  them as  an  instrument yielding  a high  social
return.  14  Furthermore, OSECs can have the guise of development aid.  Mixed
credits are  attractive to governments since development assistance  is often
politically unpopular.  It is tempting to create a constituency for such aid by
tying it to exports that benefit particular industries.
It is a different matter how the importing countries' are affected
by  export  credit  subsidies.  From  the  importers' point  of  view,  they  ire
beneficial to  the  extent  that these  subsidies mobilize  additional external
13  The problem prevails.  Recognizing the possibility of nonpayment, the
US EXIMBANK recently established a US$4.8 billion reserve on 40 percent of its
outstanding loans and loan guarantees.
14  In weighing official support to export credits against other subsidy
forms, the neutrality of the former emerges as an important advantage.  To be
eligible for the subsidy, the exporter must first find a buyer for its product.
Official export credit support only discriminates ir favor of capital goods in
general.19
resources at low cost. 15 But subsidies may cause major distortions and their
overall costs  might be quite high.  Based on  World Bank staff  experience, earlier
work in this area categorizes these problems into five groups: excess  flows,
inappropriate projects, design  weaknesses, overpricing of goods, and corruption
(see  Larkum (1985)).
Excess flows of export credits may be due to the export promotion
mandate of the ECAs.  In the late  1970s and  early 1980s,  ECAs continued to extend
credits in certain cases where there was evidence that the recipient country
could not use the additional resources.  The argument made was that  if the
credits were not supplied by one country, they would ke supplied by another,
and the local exporter would miss a valuable business opportunity.  "National
interest" in the exporting country often overrides other considerations.
In certain cases, OSECs were used to promote inappropriate projects
or appropriate projects rendered inappropriate due to design weaknesses.  Some
were either not  sential to the development of the country or rated poorly due
to their high risk and low  rate of return.  There have been cases where projects
considered inappropriate by  the Bank staff (such  as nuclear power stations)  were
financed by ECA-supported credits because they satisfied particular objectives
of the agency's government.
Overpricing  of  goods  and  corruption  are  harder  to  document.
overpricing originates from the tied character of export credits which finance
15  Obviously untied aid is superior to export credit subsidies.20
purchases only from the country granting the cred t.  Tying discourag3s buyers
from seeking competitive tenders for purchases.  Furthermore, local producers
and suppliers in other developing countries which lack similar export credit
schemes are  discriminated against.  Corruption, i.e., the collusion of buyers
and sellers in  defrauding the ECAs, is  also  widely believed to constitute a  major
problem.  These would partially explain the aad fact that SSA pays about 20 to
30 percent  higher  prices  for  its  imports  as  recently  documented  by  Yeats
(1989)  .16
More advanced developing countries have managed to organize their
use of credits in a way that maximizes benefit within the constraints of the
system  (see Larkum  (1985)).  However, subsidized export credits have exposed
poorer, less sophisticated developing countries to pressures that have resulted
in bad investment decisions.
The use of OSECs to finance inappropriate projects, overpricing of
goods, and corruption were not only consequences of ECAs' lack of interest  in
the  development  priorities of  the recipient  coantries. An underlying fu.ndamental
cause  was the mispricing of guarantees extended by the ECAs.  This brought about
the problems of "moral hazard" and "adverse selection".
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
There is  a  moral  hazard problem  whenever the liability  of the insurer
16 Yeats' figures relate to SSA countries' imports of selected goods, not
only to imports financed by export credits.21
is  aftected by the actions of the  .nsured party about which the insurer kas
incomplete information.  The problem of adverse selection arises if the insured
party knows the risks involved  while tha insurer  does not.  In the case of  OSECs,
ECA.e  were  encouraged to  disregard the  available information for  pricing purposes,
let alone trying to improve their information basis.
Most  ECAs  only  recently introduced  a  differentiated premium  structure
to reflect their actual perception of the risks involved.  Exporters gaining
access  to these guarantees had little  incentive  to behave in  a manner to  minimize
the possibility of nonpayment.  Furthermore, they had all the incentive to Peek
out riskier projects.  This was because  the guarantees artificially put the
expected value  --  for the  exporter --  of  risky projects  at par  with  sound
projects (which had an equal nominal return).  The exporter could then cash in
the implicitly subsidized premium for real risk by charging a higher price to
the importer.  Relieved from  risks, a rational exporter's interest is in finding
customers that would accept to pay the higher price.  Needless to say, it is
neither  in  the  interest  of  the  developing  countries  nor  the  ECAs  to  be
instrumental in such deals.
For developing countries, export credits belong to scarce resources
that need  to be  allocated efficiently.  The  incentive structure  facing the
exporters leads to an inefficient allocation of these resources. " Were ECAs a
relatively  minor source  of  finance  for  developing  countries,  these considerations
would  not  merit  attention.  Given  the  importance  of  ECAs,  however,  the
potentially distortive  effect of their activities  warrants major reform  efforts"
(Krueger (1969)).  Furthermore, to the  extent that the subsidy element in export22
credits comes  from the donor  country's aid budget,  as  in the  case of  m:xed
credits, sharing this  subsidy with the exporter is a  loss for the recipient
country.
V.  Need and Prospects for External Finance in the 1990s
For many  developing countries,  access to external borrowing  was
sharply curtailed in the 1980s, and real interest rates and therefore the cost
of debt-servicing greatly increased.  There were sharp drops in GNP growth. One
of the important determinants of this slowdown in growth was the decline  in
investment.  A  growing  body  of  literature  indicates that  the  decrease  in
investment rates  may be caused by the heavy  debt burden (see  e.g., Sachs (1988),
Sachs and  Huizinga (1987),  and Claessens (1988)). A heavy  debt burden  may entail
investment disincentives for two reasons.  First, the debt burden reduces the
ability of the  country to attract new capital, making  investment too costly
relative to forgone consumption.  Second, there is the "debt overhang" effect.
Debt servicing requires a large percentage of  the return on investment to be
transferred  abroad.  Thus  investment  becomet  less  attractive  relative  to
consumption.
To restore investment and growth in the 1990s, these disincentives
for  investment  have  to  be  corrected.  Nevertheless,  debt  and debt-service
reductions  are  necessary  to  eliminate  debt  overhang.  Furthermore,  debt
reductions will have to be complemented  by new  money since most debtor countries
will need to fill financing gape as they continue  making the minimum investments
in the infrastructure.23
Alternative Sources
Capital flows  to  developing  countries  come  mainly from  three sources:
official development assistance, export credits, and private flows.  Private
flows  are  nainly  composed  of  commercial-bank  lending  and  foreign  direc'
investment.
Lending by  commercial banks  is likely to be  slow to  recover  in
1990s, because of the loeeea already suffered since the beginning of the debt
crisis and the continuing problems of developing countries resulting from the
debt overhang.  At this stage, it is widely believed that commercial banks do
not have  incentives to  resume  large scale  lending to developing  countiies.
Increasing their  loan  loss reserves  and  lowering their portfolio  exposure,
commercial banks have given a strong signal that  voluntary financing will resume
only  if there  is a major  improvement in their perception of debtor country
prospects.  In the 1990s,  credit flows  to developing countries will likely shift
toward trade, project, and private sector financing.  Developing countries will
have  to  adopt adjustment programs  to provide  an environment  attractive  for
foreign flows.
In  recent years foreign  direct investment  has become an increasingly
important source of external  finance for many developing countries.  To the
extent the climate for foreign investment improves in these countries, foreign
direct investment may be expected to increase.  The Wcrld Bank Group and the
regional development banks also contribute to the increase in foreign direct24
investmern  through  their involvement  in  adjustment  programs, promotion  of  private
sector development, and insurance of investment flowa. 17
OSECB  can  also  facilitate  foreign  direct  investments.  In the
minerals  industry, for example, a  fall in the equity capital/loan  ratio  in
foreign direct investments was  observed in the  1970s (see Radetzki  (1980)).
Heavy investment requiremente coupled with a perception of expropriation risk
have led the investors to dilute the risk on equity capital.  In this context
OSECs were an important  source in  financing  machinery  and  equipment (see  Radetzki
and Zorn (1979)).  It may be expected that in the new decade the less risky and
relatively cheap capital made available by OSECs will be exploited by roreign
investors and augment the investment volume.  We have observed that officially
guaranteed export credits covered nearly half of all capital flows to SSA from
private  financial sources.  This  is evidence to the  importance of OSECs  in
prospective private sector initiatives for investment in Sub-Saharan African
countries.
Although the contribution of foreign direct investment to capital
flows is expected to increase over time, most  likely it will  not be able to
compensate fully  for the projected shortfall in  private lending.  The reluctance
of commercial banks in providing new money will necessitate a greater role for
official development assistance.  As the chances of a dramatic  increase in
development aid is slim, OSECs may once again play an important role in the
external financing of the developing countries.
17  Investment  insurance  is  provided  by  the  Multilateral  Investment
Guarantee Agency of the World Bank Group.25
VI.  Enhancino Efficiency of OSECs in the 1990a
It is  important  to underline  that some  of  the criticism in this  paper
concerning the past experience with OSECs is equally valid for other forms of
external finance.  There are glaring examples of uneconomic  investments and
expenditures financed by bilateral development aid and by private commercial
banks.  After all, ECAs were  not the sole or the principal culprits  in the
"excessive" lending and the following debt crisis.
We adopt  the  working hypothesis  that, in  the foreseeable  future,  ECAs
will  continue to be  important agents in international  finance.  We broadly
identify three areas of impact to enhance the efficiency of OSECs as a source
of external finance for developing countries.  These are i) the ECAs themselves,
ii) cooperation between  ECAs and multilateral development agencies, and iii)
the institutional and economic environment in the developing countries.
With fiscal considerations as their main motive, the driving force
in  reforming the operations of ECAs is  the increasing scrutiny  by their guardian
authorities and  national  legislatures.  There  is also  a likelihood of  some
discipline imposed  by super national bodies, such as in  the case of the European
Community.  We already mentioned some relatively recent developments  in this
respect.  One is the amendments to the  OECD Consensus which considerably reduced
the gap between the minimum allowable interest rates and the market rate.  The
second is the increase in the share of minimum concessional element irn  "mixed
credits".  The third is the  move towards a more differentiated premium structure26
in the official guarantee and insurance schemes.  Finally, we mentioned the
efforts by some ECAs which try to price each guarantee individually to reflect
the risk of nonpayment by the buyer.
To enhance the efficiency of OSECs, the burden is also considerable
for the borrowing developing countries.  Especially to induce direct lending to
the private sector,  much needs  to be  done  besides implementation  of the  necessary
adjustment  policies  to  improve general  creditworthiness.  Often  it  is the
domestic distortions and the related rents which lie behind wasteful investment
decisions and corruption, with or without OSECs.  Furthermore, some ECAs which
are eager to expand their nonguaranteed lending to the private sector face  many
practical  problems  (Johnson, Fisher  and  Harris  (1990)).  Lack  of  adequate
accounting standards and complications in legal systems concernLng potential
claims discourage business with the private sector.
Prospects for Cooperation between ECAs and Multilateral Development Aoencies
Cooperation between multilateral development  agencies  (MDAs) and
ECAs can improve the efficiency of the OSECs for both the exporting and the
recipient countries.  Obviously, the immediate objective of export promotion is
not necessarily compatible  with the financial  soundness  of ECAs  or with the long-
term development objectives of the recipient countries.  Nevertheless, MDA - ECA
cooperation can be fruitful to all parties if project feasibility is enhanced.
After  all, developed  countries cannot be unconcerned  at the outcome of  the
investment projects financed by export credits.  If the development objective
is achieved, exporters will have access to growing markets that do not require27
subsidies.  More directly, channeling resources to good quality projects will
decrease the cost of ECAs, and save taxpayers money in the donor countries.
Project appraisal is the key  issue in ensuring efficient use of
export credits.  The quality of individual projects is the major determinant of
a  country's debt servicing capacity in  the long-run.  Project appraisal includes
the determination of the project's importance and its compatibility  with the
country's  overall  development  objectives. Ultimately, the  most effective  project
screening process for project approval is the one developed by the recipient
countries themselves.  This, however, requires an efficient administration and
the technical competence to evaluate investment projects.  For those countries
which have inadequate project screening capacities, MDA - ECA cooperation can
prove invaluable.
A  direct means of cooperation is cofinancing.  Through cofinancing
the MDAs provide the recipients and the ECAs  with information on the suitability
of projects and technical judgement on the  merits of individual proposals.  MDAs
also provide  lists of projects eligible  for financing to a  large numnber  of
potential cofinanciers in an effort to obtain early expressions of interest.
This  exchange of information  is  also  useful in  enabling the financing  of approved
projects  and  in  improving the  terms  for borrowers  by  allowing  competitive
international bidding for projects.
The "umbrella  function" of the MDAs in cofinanced projects improves
probably the worst aspect of OSECs by reducing the "import composition costs"
for developing countries.  In large projects, by receiving OSZCs from several28
sources, the "umbrella" organization can make purchases from the best supplier
for each component.  Furthermore, the procurement procedures of MDAs might be
applied to the whole project as a means of price and quality control, although
this seems to be an unlikely scenario.18
An estimate of the overall magnitude of cofinancing involving ECAs
and MDAs is difficult to obtain.  However the role of OSECs in the cofinancing
operations of the World Bank should shed a light to the global picture.  In the
1980-1989 period,  the World Bank (including  IDA)  was involved in  about a  thousand
"packages" with a total value of US$57 billion  (see Appendix Table 4).  The
overall contribution  of  OSECs to this sum  was 22  per:ent.  Cofinancing operations
in the lowest income countries (with  a per capita GNP less  than US$425) amounted
to USS 21 billion.  In this case, OSECs' share was 18 percent.  For countries
in the next income bracket (USS426-835), OSECs' share was 24 percent of US$10
billion.  OSECs' contribution was the highest in industrial projects, the power
and energy field, and telecommunications.
In the 1990s there will be increased emphasis in many developing
countries on  the development of  the private  sector, and  therefore,  private
investments.  This trend, encouraged by the MDAs, will necessitate credit flows
to the private sector in  developing countries.  However, it is difficult for  the
ECAs to assess the financial strength of private enterprises.  In this context,
a  promising attempt is  the  recent  EXCEL (Export  Credit Enhanced  Leverage) program
of the World Bank.  The program will promote the flow of export credits and
18 ECAs currently oppose to this latter practice.29
World  Bank  loans to  development  banks  and  financial  intermediaries  in the
recipient  countries.  These  institutions which will  be  responsible  for the
placement of the loans  are expected to intermediate  between foreign lenders and
domestic borrowers.  The World Bank will provide a portion of the financing,
assist in identifying  the intermediary institution, and,  when deemed necessary,
contribute to the evaluation of individual loan placements.  Although the ECAs
will not have the Bank's preferred creditor status, they will be assured that
the Bank will make every effort to seek full repayment of the loans.
For Sub--aharan African countries which suffer an acute shortage of
technical skills and administrative capacity to develop and  evaluate  projects,
ECA-MDA  cooperation  can play  a  crucial  role  to  increase the  flow  of,  and
efficiency in  the use of OSECs.  The fact that these flows have been declining,
and that SSA paid on the average 20 to 30 percent higher prices for its imports
bear witness to the importance of the prospects for MDA-ECA cooperation.30
VII. Conclusions
The general thesis of the paper is  that, officially supported export
credits  (OSECs) have been  an  important source of  external  finance  for the
developing countries, and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)  was not an exception in this
respect.  However, designed as policy tools primarily to boost exports, OSECs
were distortive and inefficient financial instruments, both fur the exporting
and the recipient countries.
OSECs,  which dried  up  in the early  1980s, are  showing signs of
gaining momentum again.  The paper contends that, given the current economic and
political environment, development aid and bank lending will remain suppressed.
In this environment, OSECs can reemerge as an important source of relatively
cheap and readily available form of finance.
SSA has greater difficulty compared to other regions in attracting
capital from private sources.  Official support in the form of insurance and
guarantee coverage has been,  and  will likely  continue  to be, a  crucial instrument
in the realization of these flows.
Both under pressure of earlier losses, and increasing scrutiny by
their guardian authorities and national legislatures, export credit agencies
(ECAs) have been increasing the flexibility of their operations with growing
emphasis on pricing mechanisms.31
Increasing cooperation between ECAs and niultilateral  development
agencies  (MDAs), such as the World Bank,  is a very positive  development  in
reducing the waste and increasing  the efficiency of  OSECs for  both the donor and
the recipient countries.  Sub-Saharan African countries, which are impaired by
the shortage of technical skills and administrative  capacity, and  which may have
suffered heavily from ill practices in export credits, stand to gain most from
this cooperation.
Finally, a  major source  of inefficiency  in  the use  of external funds,
whether this be OSECs or else, is distortions in the domestic economies of the
borrowing countries.  Especially to induce lending to the private sector by
ECAs,  the  developing  countries  have  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  their
marketplace and institutions.32
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TOTAL  NET  MEDIUM-  AND  LONG-TERM  RESOURCE  FLOWS  FROM  DAC COUNTRIES  TO DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
t  US S Millions  )
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
A. OFFICIAL  FLOWS  (a+b)  a/  22,264.1 22,004.0 23,415.2 21,922.4 24,887.4 25,386.8 28,622.2 33,442.9 39,246.2
a.  Official  Development  Assistance 17,932.6 18,080.9 18,164.7 18,345.9 19,478.3 21,638.2 25,877.8 29,454.4 32,704.9
Bilateral  Aid  17,932.6 18,080.9 18,164.7 18,345.9 19,478.3 21,638.2 25,877.8 29,454.4 3,.,704.9
1. Grants a/  13,931.0 13,037.1 13,127.5 13,940.9 15,281.4 21,572.0 20,748.0 22,842.4 25,561.1
2. Concessional  Loans  4,002.9  5,044.3  5,036.8  4,405.6  4,196.9  4,067.1  5,130.8  6,613.4  7,143.4
Contributions  To
Multilateral  Organizations  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0
1.  Capital  Subscriptioris  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0
2.  Grants  and other  . . . . . . . . -
b. Other  Official  Flows  4,331.5  3,923.1  5,250.5  3,576.5  5,409.1  3,748.6  2,7U4.4  3,988.5  6,541.3
Bitateral  OOF  3,720.9  3,121.0  4,552.1  3,114.9  4,989.1  3,300.7  2,304.1  3,674.1  6,215.6
1.  Export  Credits  c/  2,168.2  2,034.8  2,563.5  2,741.5  1,363.8  -1F2.3 -1,156.2 -2,505.6 -1,054.3
2. Nonconcessional  Loans  1,552.7  1,086.2  1,988.6  373.4  3,625.3  3,483.0  3,460.3  6,179.7  7,269.9
3. Other  611.5  802.1  698.9  462.8  420.3  448.2  440.6  31'.7  255.0
Multilateral  Organiz.  . . . . . ..
B. PRIVATE  FLOWS  35,661.1 50,029.6 39,697.6 28,268.7 34,685.2  2,477.5 22,479.8 13,665.8 19,786.5
a.  Direct  Investment  10,106.0  16,168.4  11,619.8  8,741.4  10,839.9  5,986.8  10,699.7  20,841.7  21,170.4
b.  Bilateral  Portfolio  14,579.4  23,050.8  21,012.6  14,834.8  20,296.0  -3,911.1  14,421.2  -2,782.4  253.0
c.  Multilateral  Portfolio  . . . . . .
d.  Private  Export  Credits  d/  10,975.7  10,810.4  7,065.2  4,692.5  3,549.3  401.8  -2,641.1  -4,393.5  -1,636.9
e.  Other  Private  /b  . . . . . .
C. TOTAL  FLOWS  (A+B)  57,925.2 72,033.6 63,112.8 50,191.1 59,572.6  27,864.3  51,102.0  47,108.7  59,032.7
Memo  Items:
Technical  Cooperation  Grants  5,388.2  5,136.6  5,303.1  5,701.0  5,785.1  8,081.1  7,425.8  9,206.9  9,984.6
Total  Export  Credits  13,143.9 12,845.2  9,628.7  7,434.0  4,913.1  219.5 -3,797.3 -6,899.1 -2,691.2
(con't.)APPENDIX  TABLE  1  (concluded)
TOTAL  NET MEDIUM-  AND LONG-TERM  RESOURCE  FLOUS  FROM  DAC  COUNTRIES  TO  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
(US  S  Millions
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979
A. OFFICIAL  FLOWS  (a+b)  a/  6,381.7  7,132.9  7,697.2  8,945.0  9,495.2 11,442.2 11,400.5 11,780.9 16,205.6 18,782.8
a. Official  Development  Assistance  5,556.8  6,196.3  6,493.9  6,933.9  8,007.7  9,571.5  9,289.1  9,752.0 12,843.9 16,040.4
Bilateral  Aid  5,556.8  6,196.3  6,493.9  6,933.9  8,007.7  9,571.5  9,289.1  9,752.0 12,843.9 16,040.4
1. Grants al  3,238.3  3,543.1  4,255.6  4,3t3.4  5,095.3  6,061.8  6,353.4  6,869.5  9,120.2 11,398.2
2.  Concessional  Loans  2,318.0  2,653.9  2,236.7  2,621.1  2,911.7  3,510.2  2,934.7  2,880.8  3,723.6  4,643.6
Contributions  To
Multilateral  Organizations  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0
1.  Capital  Subscriptions  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0
2.  Grants  and other  . . . . . .
b. Other  Official  Flows  824.9  936.6  1,203.3  2,011.1  1,487.5  1,870.7  2,111.4  2,028.9  3,361.7  2,742.4
Bilateral  OOF  779.4  862.2  1,150.0  1,992.6  1,471.9  1,849.1  2,101.5  2,017.4  3,296.1  2,707.1
1.  Export  Credits cI  573.7  680.0  763.2  1,024.4  671.8  1,143.8  1,340.6  1,434.7  2,052.0  1,784.8  U
2.  Nonconcessional  Loans  205.7  182>2  386.8  968.2  800.1  705.3  760.9  582.7  1,244.1  922.3
3. Other  46.2  74.9  52.1  18.5  15.7  21.8  10.1  11.5  65.6  36.0
Multilateral  Organiz.  . . . . . . .
B.  PRIVATE FLOWS  5,628.3  6,059.0  6,383.3  8,144.0  6,414.8  22,803.6 23,470.6 26,387.0 38,458.0 41,336.0
a.  Direct  Investment  3,099.8  2,771.0  3,383.9  3,816.4  798.3  10,153.4  7,676.4  7,898.9  8,960.7  11,433.1
b. Bilateral  Portfolio  493.2  602.9  1,65G.5  3,127.1  3,219.8  8,296.4  9,110.3  9,752.2 19,868.8 20,963.1
c. Multilateral  Portfolio  . . . . . . .
d. Private  Export  Credits d/  2,035.3  2,685.1  1,348  9  1,200.5  2,396.7  4,353.8  6,683.9  8,735.9  9,628.5  8,939.8
e. Other  Private  /b  . . . . . . .
C. TOTAL  FLOWS  (A+B)  12,010.0 13,191.9 14,080.5 17,089.0 15,910.0 34,245.8 34,871.1 38,167.9 54,663.6 60,118.8
Memo Items:
Technical  Cooperation  Grants  1,440.3  1,597.2  1,761.1  2,164.0  2,336.7  2,790.9  2,740.3  2,913.0  3,610.5  4,466.9
Total  Export  Credits  2,609.0  3,365.1  2,112.1  2,224.9  3,068.5  5,497.6  8,024.5 10,170.6 11,680.5 10,724.6APPENDIX TABLE lB
TOTAL NET MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM RESOURCE FLOWS FROM DAC COUNTRIES TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
( US S Millions  )
1980  198  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
A.  OFFICIAL  FLOWS  (a+b)  a/  5,871.0  5,880.7  5,873.5  5,821.1  6,901.9  6,992.0  8,587.4  10,787.6  11,769.8
a.  Official  Development  Assistance  5,007.1  5,098.3  5,093.9  4,986.9  5,205.1  5,934.9  7,458.4  8,706.7  10,072.5
Bilateral  Aid  5,007.1  5,098.3  5,093.9  4,986.9  5,205.1  5,934.9  7,458.4  8,706.7  10,072.5
1.  Grants a/  4,552.7  4,404.6  4,140.8  4,159.5  4,268.2  6,187.0  6,301.0  7,004.2  8,237.6
2.  Concessional  Loans  454.4  694.2  952.  827.6  937.3  748.0  1,158.2  1,701.9  1,834.7
Contributions To
Multilateral Organizations  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0
1.  Capital  Subscriptions  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  kj
2.  Grants  and  other  . . . . . .
b.  Other  Official  Flows  863.9  782.4  779.6  834.2  1,696.8  1,057.1  1,129.0  2,080.9  1,697.3
Bilateral  OOF  864.1  782.1  780.0  834.9  1,682.5  1,045.5  1,125.9  2,054.3  1,675.6
1.  Export  Credits cJ  -31.7  189.1  94.8  167.5  -69.0  176.8  -78.7  -79.0  -29.0
2.  Nonconcessional  Loans  895.8  593.0  685.2  667.4  1,751.5  868.7  1,204.6  2,133.3  1,704.6
3.  Other  .0  .0  .0  .0  14.9  11.8  3.2  27.2  9.1
Multilateral Organiz.  . . . . . .
B. PRIVATE  FLOWS  3,921.2  4,418.3  5,344.0  2,379.6  -197.4  -461.5  -31.7  -198.4  -1,301.0
a.  Direct  Investment  994.5  1,808.8  2,239.4  337.6  -289.8  -218.6  611.4  1,173.1  254.0
b. Bilateral  Portfolio  1,198.2  1,284.0  1,605.9  1,292.9  122.6  -173.2  -159.7  -309.3  47.5
c. Multilateral  Portfolio  . . . . . .
d. Private  Export  Credits dl  1,728.5  1,325.5  1,498.7  749.1  -30.2  -69.7  -483.4  -1,062.2  -1,602.5
e. Other Private /b  . . . . . .
C. TOTAL  FLOWS  (A+B)  9,792.2 10,299.0  11,217.5  8,200.7  6,704.5  6,530.5  8,555.7  10,589.2  10,468.8
Memo  Items:
Technical  Cooperation  Grants  2,047.2  1,727.3  1,828.4  1,790.4  1,584.6  2,774.7  2,368.8  2,703.4  2,875.2
Total  Export  Credits  1,696.8  1,514.6  1,593.5  916.6  -99.2  107.1  -562.1  -1,141.2  -1,631.5
(cont.)APPENDIX  TABLE  1B (concluded)
TOTAL  NET  MEDIUM-  AND  LONG-TERM  RESOURCE  FLOWS  FROM  DAC COUNTRIES  TO SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICA
(  US S Millions  )
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979
A. OFFICIAL  FLOWS  (a+b)  a/  960.4  1,145.9  1,305.6  1,682.9  1,785.7  2,418.9  2,511.6  2,763.8  3,690.7  4,515.8
a.  Official  Development  Assistance  937.4  1,076.6  1,197.0  1,425.9  1,695.6  2,217.8  2,225.1  2,440.9  3,312.8  4,196.0
Bilateral  Aid  937.4  1,076.6  1,197.0  1,425.9  1,695.6  2,217.8  2,225.1  2,440.9  3,312.8  4,196.0 1.  Grants a/  714.3  824.5  1,215.0  1,175.2  1,370.1  1,719.7  1,838.7  2,002.3  3,033.3  3,642.6 2.  Concessional  Loans  223.3  251.6  -18.5  250.7  325.2  498.2  386.4  437.5  280.3  553.6
Contributions  To
Nultilateral  Organizations  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0 1.  Capital  Subscriptions  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0 2. Grants and other  . . . . . . .
b. Other  Official  Flows  23.0  69.3  108.6  257.0  90.1  201.1  286.5  322.9  377.9  319.8 Bilateral  OOF  11.7  53.2  86.6  255.9  88.8  201.3  286.4  323.2  377.6  320.1 1.  Export  Credits /c  4.3  53.6  51.1  150.8  64.2  151.3  95.7  77.9  42.1  76.7 2. Nonconcessional  Loons  7.4  -. 4  35.5  105.1  24.6  50.0  190.7  245.3  335.5  243.4 3. Other  11.6  16.4  21.8  .8  1.1  .0  .0  .0  .0  .0 Multilateral  Organiz.  . . . . . .
B. PRIVATE  FLOWS  448.0  573.8  629.7  822.1  994.5  2,079.0  1,510.4  2,762.3  2,457.4  2,701.4
a.  Direct  Investment  198.5  266.2  333.6  59.4  214.9  847.9  490.5  789.6  451.3  415.5 b.  Bilateral  Portfolio  19.9  73.4  68.4  318.2  217.9  248.2  181.0  109.2  935.5  681.1 c.  Multilateral  Portfolio  . . .
d. Private  Erport  Credits d/  229.6  234.2  227.7  444.5  561.7  982.9  838.9  1,863.5  1,070.6  1,604.8 e. Other Private /b  . . . . . . . .
C. TOTAL  FLOWS  (AMB)  1,408.4  1,719.7  1,935.3  2,505.0  2,780.2  4,497.9  4,022.0  5,526.1  6,148.1  7,217.2
Memo  Items:
Technical  Cooperation  Grants  454.9  545.5  629.5  739.4  785.1  14.6  1,060.4  1,083.9  1,458.1  1,737.9 Total  Export  Credits  233.9  287.8  278.8  595.3  625.9  1* 4.2  934.6  1,941.4  1,112.7  1,681.5
Source: OECD,  Creditor  Reporting  System;  OECDG  groupings.
Notes:
a  Technical  Cooperation  Grants  included.
b  Includes  NGO Grants.
c  Export  credits  extended  airectly  by official  institutions.
d  Officially  insured  supplter's  credits  plus  guaranteed  bank credits.38
PPEND  I X TABLE 2
OUTSTANDING  DEBT DUE TO OFFICIALLY SUPPORTED  MEDIUM-  AND LONG-TERM  EXPORT




COUNTRY  TYPE  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
DIRECT  148.0  139.9  157.4  181.1  189.0  202.2  203.8
CAMEROON  GUARANTEED  425.5  332.5  537.2  650.6  750.3  629.5  532.5
TOTAL  573.5  472.4  694.6  831.7  939.3  d31.7  736.3
DIRECT  2.8  3.5  3.4  3.2  3.4  3.0  2.8
CENTRAL  AF REPUBLIC  GUARANTEED  19.9  20.0  7.1  7.8  4.0  3.3  2.9
TOTAL  22.7  23.5  10.5  11.0  7.4  6.3  5.7
DIRECT  37.4  29.3  21.0  28.0  42.8  72.9  67.9
CONGO  GWARANTEED  339.7  301.6  530.6  640.1  864.0  857.2  588.6
TOTAL  377.1  330.9  551.6  668.1  906.8  930.1  656.5
DIRECT  171.1  187.9  197.6  224.2  203.4  216.7  244.7
COTE  D'  IVORIE  GUARANTEED 771.6  736.3  707.7  575.5  719.6  451.7  246.4
TOTAL  942.7  924.2  905.3  799.7  923.0  668.4  491.1
DIRECT  31.1  27.3  25.2  40.5  55.8  64.3  73.8
GABON  GUARANTEED  396.1  433.6  557.2  822.9  1152.8  912.4  749.5
TOTAL  427.2  460.9  582.4  863.4  1208.6  976.7  823.3
DIRECT  19.5  12.4  9.1  6.5  6.6  4.0  2.9
GHANA  GUARANTEED 123.9  98.5  72.2  93.7  92.3  162.5  142.6
TOTAL  143.4  110.9  81.3  100.2  98.9  166.5  145.5
DIRECT  25.1  11.5  9.1  11.9  5.3  8.0  7.1
GUINEA  GUARANTEED 104.7  72.5  82.3  71.1  89.2  44.2  32.3
TOTAL  129.8  84.0  91.4  83.0  94.5  52.2  39.4
DIRECT  104.9  97.7  104.7  91.6  141.8  145.1  119.5
KENYA  GUARANTEED  393.3  337.3  309.5  374.2  446.7  477.7  568.5
TOTAL  498.2  435.0  414.2  465.8  588.5  622.8  688.0
DIRECT  78.1  36.6  34.0  43.3  44.4  41.5  43.0
MADAGASCAR  GUARANTEED  1vd.5  233.2  191.2  176.7  100.5  84.9  70.0
TOTAL  226.6  269.8  225.2  220.0  144.9  126.4  113.0
DIRECT  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.5
MAURITIUS  GUARANTEED  9.8  6.7  12.1  11.9  18.6  35,0  44.5
TOTAL  9.8  6.7  12.1  11.9  18.6  35.0  48.0
DIRECT  77.4  229.3  281.1  448.5  447.8  449.3  563.2
NIGERIA  GUARANTEED  3276.9  2843.3  3299.2  5108.0  5873.4  4995.7  3074.0
TOTAL  3354.3  3072.6  3580.3  5556.5  6321.2  5445.0  3637.2
DIRECT  21.2  20.5  21.7  23.7  20.0  19.4  16.0
SENEGAL  GUARANTEED 191.0  183.6  161.3  189.4  170.3  96.5  61.4
TOTAL  212.2  204.1  183.0  213.1  190.3  115.9  77.4
DIRECT  185.3  180.1  225.0  257.8  245.5  239.9  233.7
SUDAN  GUARANTEED  475.6  425.0  248.5  432.8  340.7  256.6  286.7
TOTAL  660.9  605.1  473.5  690.6  586.2  496.5  520.4
DIRECT  67.0  65.3  71.9  82.0  56.8  61.2  87.1
TANZANIA  GUARANTEED  317.0  223.6  123.8  129.1  1;6.3  155.4  110.6
TOTAL  384.0  288.9  195.7  211.1  lb. 1  216.6  197.7
DIRECT  683.2  684.9  817.2  852.8  827.9  878.0  989.1
ZAIRE  GUARANTEED 495.3  280.6  309.1  242.5  220.8  156.1  154.4
TOTAL  1178.5  965.5  1126.3  1095.3  1048.7  1034.1  1143.5
DIRECT  30.8  41.2  36.9  34.7  29.1  24.1  17.1
ZIMBABWE  GUARANTEED 223.8  254.1  271.5  365.3  438.6  489.3  400.9
TOTAL  254.6  295.3  308.4  400.0  467.7  513.4  418.0
SourCe:  OECD, Creditor  Reporting  System.
Note:  Direct  =  export  credits  extended  directly  by  official  institutions.
Guaranteed  - officially  insured  suppliers,  credits  plus  guaranteed  bank  credits.APPENDIY  TABLE  3
THE  SHARE  OF OFFICIALLY  SUPPORTED  NEDIUID-  AND  LONG-TERN  EXPORT  CREDITS  IN  TOTAL  OUTSTANDING  DEBT,  AND  PUBLIC
AND PUBLICALLY  GUARANTEED  DEBT  OF SELECTED  SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICAN  COUNTRIES,  1982-1988
(percent)
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
total public  total public  total public  total public  total public  total public  total public
CAMEROON  21.1  29.9  17.2  25.6  25.5  40.9  28.3  41.5  25.3  39.2  20.6  29.9  17.1  25.1
CENTRAL  AF.  9.0  11.6  9.1  11.6  4.0  4.9  3.2  3.8  1.6  1.9  1.0  1.2  0.8  1.0
CONGO  19.4  21.6  17.2  19.1  28.4  31.9  22.4  29.2  24.0  29.8  18.1  22.3  13.8  16.0
COTE  DI IV.  12.1  18.8  11.8  19.0  11.5  19.6  8.2  13.7  8.2  13.6  4.9  8.0  3.5  6.1
GABoN  42.0  51.3  50.0  67.1  62.7  85.9  71.7  91.6  61.2  82.8  38.3  46.9  30.9  38.7
GHANA  10.3  13.0  6.9  9.6  4.3  7.3  4.6  8.0  3.7  6.0  5.3  7.8  4.7  6.5
GUINEA  9.5  10.6  6.2  7.0  7.3  8.2  5.6  6.4  5.0  5.4  2.3  2.5  1.5  1.7
KENYA  14.2  20.7  11.6  18.2  11.?  16.5  10.6  16.1  11.9  16.1  10.4  14.0  11.7  16.2
PADAGASCAR  11.8  13.7  12.8  15.4  10.4  12.2  8.9  10.2  4.8  5.5  3.4  3.8  3.1  3.4
PAWUITIUS  1.7  2.7  1.2  2.1  2.2  3.6  1.9  3.0  2.8  4.2  4.3  6.0  5.6  7.4
NIGERIA  26.2  37.4  16.7  25.5  19.4  31.7  28.8  43.0  27.3  33.2  18.1  19.4  11.8  12.7
SENEGAL  11.7  15.4  10.6  13.7  8.9  11.8  8.8  11.2  6.3  7.9  3.1  3.9  2.1  2.6
SUDAN  9.1  12.1  7.9  10.3  5.5  7.6  7.6  10.4  6.0  8.2  4.3  6.1  4.4  6.5
TANZANIA  '2.9  16.3  8.5  10.7  5.7  7.4  5.5  7.0  4.4  4.9  4.5  5.1  4.2  4.8
ZAIRE  24.8  29.6  19.0  22.7  22.3  27.3  18.3  22.9  15.0  18.3  12.1  14.7  13.5  16.3
ZIMBABWE  13.8  21.5  12.8  19.1  13.7  19.5  16.2  21.9  17.3  22.0  17.6  21.1  15.7  18.7
AVERAGE  17.4  23.6  13.8  19.4  14.9  21.8  17.1  24.2  16.3  21.3  11.8  14.7  9.3  11.7
Source:  OECM,  Creditor  Reporting  System,  and WorLd  Bank,  Debtor  Reporting  System.
Note:  Excluding  short-tern  (Less  than  1  y-dr)  debt.APPENDIX TABLE 4
WORLD BANK COFINANCING  OPERATIONS. FISCAL YEAR 1980-1989:  COFINANCIERS' CONTRIBUTIONa
(US  S  miltion)
Total  Cofinancingc  0fficiald  Export  Credits  Private  Bank Group GNP Per  Capitab  No.  Amount  No.  Amount  No.  Amount  No.  Awmt  Contribution  Total  Project
IBRD  IDA  Cost
s  0  425  569  20,712.7  550  16,198.0  39  3,839.0  13  675.7  12,227.8  15,308.3  88,753.6
S  426  - 835  207  10,303.2  201  7,580.6  18  2,455.6  8  267.1  11,613.1  1,325.2  37,266.9
S  836  - 1,725  145  11,981.1  110  5,381.1  51  3,267.8  32  3,332.3  9,863.3  82.0  38,615.4
5  1,726  - 3,009  83  13,430.6  45  4,497.9  23  2,917.5  39  6,015.2  11,762.9  --  55,356.5
S 3,010  - OVER  14  425.5  11  151.2  6  259.9  2  14.4  252.2  --  1,313.4
TOTAL  1018  56,853.1  917  33,808.8  137  12,739.8  94  10,304.7  45,719.2  16,715.4  221,305.8
Source:  Wortd  Bank.
Notes:
*  It  should  be  noted  that  these  statistics  are  cohpited  from  the  financing  ptans  presented  at  the  time  of  approval  of  World  Bank  loans by its  Board  of  Exeuctive Directors.  The  mounts  of  officiat  cofinancing  are in  most  cases  firm  commitments  by  that  stae;  export  credits  and private  cofina  ncing  aounts  are,  however, generalty  onty  estimtes  since  such  cofinancing  is  actuatly  arranged  as  required  for  project  iaplementation  and  gets  firmed  up  a  year  or  two  tater  after  Board approval.
b  1988  U.S.  Dottars,  according  to  the  1988  Wortd  Bank  Atlas.
c  The  number  of  operations  shown  under  different  sources  add up  to  a figure  exceeding  the  total  nmiber  of  cofine  nced  projects  because  a  nmiber  of  projects  were cofinanced  from  more  than  one  source.
d  These  figures  include  cofinancing  with  untied  toans  from  the  Export-lmport  Bank of  Japan.  Please  note  that  in  alt  reports  datad  be'ore  October,  1989,  such  untied loans  were  inctuded  in  the  export  credits  column.PRE Working Paper Series
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